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11 Introduction
Firms’ R&D projects are affected by the results of basic research. A firm utilizes the
results to reduce R&D project costs or the results may interact with the firm’s R&D
output in the market, either complementing or substituting it. A prominent example of
the latter is the burgeoning Open Source movement that has properties of basic
research. We raise the question, how does the existence of a basic research project
affect firm behaviour and the R&D manager’s incentives to exert unobservable effort?
 We present a model where the directions and objectives of basic research projects are
known by firms. A firm’s R&D project may either be fixed or the owner or manager
can choose its direction in relation to a relevant basic research project. Firms do take
into account basic research projects in their R&D decisions. For example, Ward and
Dranove (1995) provided evidence that firms in the pharmaceutical industry increase
their R&D in those therapeutic categories that exhibit investments in basic research.
For our purposes, the phenomenon we call a basic research project has to have the
following properties that are widely accepted in the literature1. First, its properties and
eventual output are public and freely usable. Thus the output carries a zero price.
Second, the applicability of a basic research project’s output in the firm’s R&D, even
if the firm knows the general outline of the research project, is uncertain. Third, the
scientists have no strategic considerations when they create a basic research project.
Open Source programming is an interesting example of activity reminiscent of basic
research in that it fulfils the above requirements2. Basic research is usually considered
to substitute firms’ R&D effort and accordingly reduce costs. However, Steinmueller
(1994, p.59) pointed out that basic research may affect R&D by “reducing the
expected returns from some lines of applied research… or increasing the real returns in
other areas”. Open Source programs enhance or compete with firms’ programs in the
market. A pharmaceutical basic research project tries to create a molecule that a
1 For surveys of the general economic properties of basic research, see Stephan (1996), Dasgupta and
David (1987, 1994), Brooks (1994), Salter and Martin (2001) and Goel and Rich (2005). Evenson and
Kislev (1976) and Aghion and Howitt (1997) provided models which analyse the growth effects of the
interaction between basic and applied research.
2 For descriptions of Open Source see Lerner and Tirole (2002), Schiff (2002), Heintzman (2003),
Mustonen (2003, 2005) and The GNU project (2004a,b).
2firm’s R&D also seeks. If the basic research project succeeds, its free output
substitutes the firm’s product in the (licensing) market and thus it is possible that the
existence of basic research reduces a firm’s expected revenue. Our analysis allows for
both positive and negative revenue effects.
We analyze the employment contract of the R&D manager of a firm. The effort of the
risk-averse manager is unobservable to the owner, who can only observe the market
revenue. In our analysis, we extend the contracting model of Holmström and Milgrom
(1987) and Holmström (1979). It features uncertain revenue, a linear incentive,
unobservable continuous agent effort and convex costs3. The presence of basic
research influences the contract design in two ways. First, basic research results
reduce the firm’s R&D costs or they complement or substitute the firm’s R&D in the
market and this has a direct effect to the observable revenue of the firm. Second, basic
research projects are inherently uncertain and a stronger influence of basic research
also increases the volatility of the firm’s revenue. As a first step, we analyse the
employment contract assuming that the position of the basic research project relative
to the firm’s R&D project is given. It is also natural to analyse the contract in the case
where the owner can choose the position of the R&D project in relation to basic
research. As a third case, we analyse the contract assuming that the firm’s key R&D
decisions are under the discretion of the manager. After accepting the contract, he
chooses both effort and the relative position of the R&D project. Both choices are
unobservable.
If the relative positions of basic research and R&D projects are given, the effect of
basic research presence is quite natural. The stronger the expected revenue impact of
the basic research, positive or negative, the more volatile is the revenue. The owner
offers a lower-powered incentive because of this volatility and thus the optimal
incentive coefficient is decreasing in the revenue impact. In accordance with the
traditional result, now the incentive decreases also in the variance of the output of
basic research and in risk aversion. Comparison of the cases where the owner or the
manager endogenously chooses the relative position of the R&D project shows that
the owner always chooses a closer proximity between the projects and the incentive is
3 For a survey of incentives in organizations, see Gibbons (1998). Parallel to our research, Dasgupta
and David (1994) and Lazear (1997) researched incentives to perform basic research.
3lower-powered. In stark contrast to received literature, in both cases the optimal
incentive coefficient is increasing in the basic research output uncertainty and in the
manager’s risk aversion. Traditionally it has been considered that the utilization of
basic research in firm R&D is hampered by friction in knowledge transfer. The ability
to absorb research knowledge has been presented as the motivation for costly basic
research in firms (e.g Rosenberg 1990). Our analysis reveals another cost factor in
basic research utilization: If the firm cannot align its R&D with basic research, the
higher is the uncertainty over the basic research project’s outcome the lower is the
R&D effort. With optimally aligned R&D, increased uncertainty of basic research
surprisingly leads to higher R&D effort. So if owners or managers are able to adjust,
high risk in basic research creates a positive externality to firm R&D and this could be
taken into account if the government can influence the risk levels of basic research.
The analysis further shows that firm profits are higher when the owner determines the
R&D strategy. This indicates that in research intensive industries, we should observe
firm owners with scientific knowledge having an advantage to institutional owners. In
all scenarios, the closeness between basic research and R&D projects and the R&D
manager’s effort are inversely related, implying that basic research crowds out R&D
due to moral hazard in R&D.
Baggs and Bettignies (2004) found within a duopoly model of horizontal
differentiation that increased competition directly brings about stronger incentives4.
Raith (2003) reached the same conclusion, albeit indirectly, in an oligopoly model5.
Our result is reversed in the case where basic research substitutes the firm’s R&D in
the market – a natural outcome in Open Source programming. The stronger substitute
is the basic research outcome, – and thus the more ‘competitive’ the situation of the
firm – the weaker is the optimal incentive. In the case of complement or cost-reducing
basic research, stronger complementarity, which can be interpreted as reduced
‘competition’, brings about a weaker incentive. In the literature, the selection of
riskiness has been recognized. Meth (1996) analysed a scenario where the agent can
expend productive effort and effort to reduce outcome variance, both unobservable.
Meth reported conditions under which the principal wants to motivate the agent to
4 In Baggs and Bettignies (2004), a lower transport cost reduces the principals’ marginal cost of
inducing effort. In equilibrium, they choose higher incentives.
5 In Raith (2003), competition induces firm exit, which in turn creates higher cost-reduction incentives
for remaining firms.
4work on reducing the variance. In Demski and Dye (1999), the manager can make
mean-variance trade-offs in project selection. They presented and analyzed a special
contract, linear in outcome sample mean and variance and including penalty terms
from deviations between the announced mean and variance and their realized samples.
Ghatak and Pandey (2000) analysed agricultural contracting and found that under
limited liability, sharecropping is generated only when the tenant simultaneously and
independently chooses effort and risk. In contrast to this literature, in our paper, we
assume that the change in outcome variance is an externality of a decision involving
the firm’s R&D project position and thus costless.
Our results provide an explanation to empirical findings that are contrary to the results
of the Holmström-Milgrom model. In a survey of over twenty empirical studies,
Prendergast (1999, 2002) reported that a majority of them found a neutral or positive
relationship between measures of risk and pay-performance sensitivity. Prendergast
(2000) offered reasons why the standard theory would not hold. In uncertain
environments, i) input monitoring, ii) sorting, iii) investigations and iv) career
concerns are less effective. Adding such assumptions to the standard model yields
results where the incentive is increasing in risk. Raith (2003) in turn showed in a
model of oligopoly with free entry how an increase in competition, for example in the
substitutability of goods, increases both the incentive to cost reduction and output
risk6, resulting in a positive correlation between the two. In our model, the result
follows causally from the manager’s or the owner’s optimal choice of the R&D
project position while the market structure remains given.
The analysis proceeds as follows: in section 2 we develop first the optimal incentive
for given basic research and R&D project directions. Then we solve for the optimal
incentive and optimal R&D project direction when either the owner or the manager
can choose the direction. In section 3 we analyse and compare the outcomes and
section 4 concludes.
6 In Raith (2003), an increase in substitutability causes firms to exit and the incentive for cost reduction
is higher for the remaining firms. Simultaneously, the constant variance of cost reduction of each firm
translates to higher output variation as the number of firms decreases.
52  The model
Consider a  moral hazard scenario ( Holmström and Milgrom 1987) with a continuous
choice of the manager’s effort and a wage contract that is linear in revenue. The risk-
neutral owner maximises his expected profit, which is the net of market revenue and
wages paid, max R wp = -% . The manager’s unobservable effort is e . We assume that
the manager’s effort is manifested as the value of the R&D project. A basic research
project exists. It’s output is uncertain, ( )~ 1,y N v% . Consider first that basic research
results affect the costs of the R&D project. The direction of the R&D project relative
to the basic research project, k , max0 k k£ < , determines the cost of the R&D project,
kya - % , where 0a >  is the fixed cost. The firm’s revenue is ( )R e kya= - -% % . The
basic research project output may alternatively affect the expected value of the R&D
project in the market. A visible example of such is Open Source programming. If the
basic research output is a substitute to the R&D project (as an OS program may well
be to a commercial program), manifested by 0k < , the revenue impact of basic
research can also be negative. Consider homogeneous buyers of mass 1 with utility
functions U V p= - , where V  is the value of the R&D outcome and p  the price.
When basic research complements a monopoly firm’s R&D, its value is V e ky= + .
The optimal price is thus p e ky= + . If basic research is a substitute, 0k < , there are
two goods for buyers to choose from with values V e=  and brV ky= - . The firm has
to set the price in such a way that buyers prefer the commercial good i.e.
0brV p V- ³ - . The optimal price is p e ky= + , and the ex-ante revenue is
R e ky= +% % . Without loss of generality we can set 0a =  and cover both cases with the
expected revenue being7:
R e ky= +% %                                                                                                             (1)
7 We acknowledge the possibility of a negative draw of the OS effort, but abstract from it (as
Holmström and Milgrom).
6The total revenue is observable. The risk-averse ( 0r > ) manager’s utility is
( )( )r w c eU e- -= - , where the cost of effort is ( )
2
2
cec e = , 0c > . In the basic analysis, we
abstract from the (general) market uncertainty. Later on, in section 3, we discuss its
effect to the results.
2.1 Baseline case: A fixed R&D project
Let us first assume that the relative position of the R&D project, k , is given. The
owner offers a contract to the manager, who accepts. The manager exerts effort e .
The outcome of the basic research project, y% , is resolved. These factors determine the
firm’s revenue. Finally, wages w  are paid. Consider the incentive pay contract
w a bR= + % . The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint follows from expected
utility maximization, ( ) 2 2 21 1max
2 2e
EU a b e k rb k v ce= + + - - , which yields the
familiar IC-condition
be
c
=                                                                                                          (IC1)
The owner maximizes expected profit, ( )[ ]max 1
b
E b e k ap = - + -  conditional on the
incentive compatibility condition (IC1) and the individual rationality condition
U u³ .                                                                                                        (IR1)
Inserting the constraints (IC1) and (IR1) yields:
( )
2
2 21max 1
2 2b
b b bE b k b k rb k v u
c c c
p é ù æ ö= - + + + - - -ç ÷ê úë û è ø
7The first order condition is 21 0brvk b
c c
- - = . Note for reference that the manager’s
risk premium is increasing in risk-aversion and variance. The FOC yields the optimal
coefficient of the incentive in the contract,
*
2
1
1
b
rvck
=
+
 .                                                                                                   (2)
Proposition 1: The closer the given basic research and R&D projects are to each
other, or the stronger complement or substitute the basic research project is to
the R&D project in the market, the lower-powered is the optimal incentive.
Proof: In (2), the larger is the absolute value of k , the smaller is the optimal
incentive. QED.
A high absolute value of k  implies that the variance of the observable revenue is
large. This in turn increases the risk premium of the manager. The owner takes this
into account and in optimum sets a low incentive. In the case of market interaction of
substitute basic research and R&D, the requirement of non-zero profits presents a
lower bound to the substitutability between them. Being a substitute to the firm’s
R&D, the presence of basic research output reduces the firm’s profit. Furthermore, it
reduces the firm’s R&D because the manager’s effort is reduced, since by (IC1), the
manager’s optimal effort and thus the R&D are proportional to the incentive
coefficient.
2.2 The owner chooses the R&D project
Suppose the owner can set the relative position of the projects Ok  by design decisions
or by selecting an optimal project from the firm’s portfolio of R&D projects. We
assume that the portfolio contains projects that differ in their closeness to the basic
research project but that the productivity of the manager is equal in all of them. The
cost of the owner’s (and later the manager’s) effort in selecting and implementing the
position is fixed by assumption and we set it to zero. The owner offers a contract to
8the manager. The manager accepts and exerts effort Oe  in R&D taking the R&D
project position as given. Again, after the uncertainty is resolved, wages are paid. The
owner will position the projects in a way that will maximise his profit anticipating the
behaviour of the manager. The choice of position has a direct effect to the owner’s
profit via a revenue or cost change and an indirect effect because it changes the
optimal incentive coefficient and thus the agent’s effort. As in the baseline case, the
manager’s optimal effort conditional on the revenue share is OO
be
c
=  from (IC1). The
owner chooses the optimal incentive and project direction taking the manager’s
choice and individual rationality (IR1) into account
( )
2
2 2
,
1max 1
2 2O O
O O O
O O O O O O Ob k
b b bE b k b k rb k v u
c c c
p é ù æ ö= - + + + - - -ç ÷ê úë û è ø
The first-order conditions read
21 0O OO O
O
brvk b
b c c
p¶
= - - =
¶
,                                                                               (3a)
21 0O O O
O
rvb k
k
p¶
= - =
¶
8.                                                                                       (3b)
Condition (3a) is equivalent to the first order condition in the baseline case and (3b)
yields the owner’s choice of the project position for a given incentive, 2
1
O
O
k
rvb
= . In
(3b), the owner equals the marginal revenue from proximity to basic research to its
marginal cost in the form of the manager’s risk premium. Being closer to basic
research increases the firm’s revenue and thus wages. But it also increases uncertainty
related to output, for which the manager must be compensated through the individual
rationality condition (IR1). Thus a bounded optimum is found. We observe that it is
the owner’s voluntary choice that introduces uncertainty to the problem.
8 We note that the second order conditions are satisfied. We assume that maxk  is sufficiently small to
ensure that the owner’s profit is higher in an interior solution than for b e=  and a very strong OS
complement.
9Solving for the optimal incentive yields9 3
1 1 0O
O
b
c rvb c
- - = , which develops to
4 3 0O O
cb b
rv
- + = .                                                                                           (4)
The optimal incentive coefficient *Ob  balances the marginal revenue from the firm’s
R&D to the marginal cost from the risk premium and from effort. Given the owner’s
choice of Ok , the risk premium is decreasing in Ob .
2.3 The manager chooses the R&D project
Consider an (institutional) owner who cannot choose an R&D project. The choice of
the relative position between the R&D project and basic research, Mk , is left to the
manager. Having accepted the contract, the manager exerts effort Me  and chooses the
position, Mk . The manager’s problem is reminiscent of the multitask problem. He
chooses optimal effort by trading off wage against disutility of effort. The manager
also chooses the optimal position by trading off wage against the risk premium. The
manager’s problem is
( ) 2 2 2
,
1 1max
2 2M M M M M Me k
EU a b e k rb k v ce= + + - -
yielding the familiar IC-condition, MM
be
c
= . The first order condition for the optimal
Mk  is
2 0M M M
M
EU b k rvb
k
¶
= - =
¶
,                                                                                       (5)
9 The second order condition is satisfied for 4 3
O
cb
rv
> .
10
which yields the IC-condition concerning the project position,
1
M
M
k
rvb
=  for 0Mb >
10.                                                                                  (IC 2)
In (5), the manager equals the marginal wage from proximity to basic research to the
marginal cost of the risk premium.
Lemma 1: For a given incentive coefficient, the owner chooses closer proximity
between R&D and basic research than does the manager, O Mk k> .
The owner wants the projects to be closer because the marginal revenue from basic
research is 1 but for the manager it is dulled by the revenue share 1Mb < . In their
decisions, both face the same marginal cost from the risk premium, which is
increasing in k . Comparison of the first order conditions (3b) and (5) shows this.
From the owner’s point of view, information has value since the manager’s
unobservable choice of project direction Mk  differs from his profit-maximising
choice. The owner anticipates the manager’s choices and sets the incentive pay to
maximise profit. Inserting the conditions IC1 and IC2 and IR1 to the firm’s profit
function yields
( )
2 2
21 1 1 1max 1
2 2M
M M M
M M M Mb
M M M
b b bE b b r b v u
c rb v c rb v rb v c
p
é ù æ ö æ ö
= - + + + - - -ç ÷ ç ÷ê ú
ë û è ø è ø
The first order condition for maximum reads:
2
1 1 0M M
M M
d b
db c rvb c
p
= - - = .11                                                                               (6)
10 We note that the second order conditions are satisfied trivially.
11 The second order condition is satisfied for 3
2
M
cb
rv
> .
11
Comparing (6) to the first order condition of the baseline case (1) shows that the
manager’s decision rule (IC2) for the project direction Mk  renders the risk premium
independent of the incentive in the owner’s optimization. The marginal revenue from
basic research (second term in (6)), is in turn increasing in the incentive coefficient,
risk-aversion and variance. The optimal incentive *Mb  balances marginal revenue
from R&D and basic research against the manager’s marginal cost of effort.  The
condition (6) develops to
3 2 0M M
cb b
rv
- + = .                                                                                                 (7)
3 Analysis and comparison of regimes
We start with
Proposition 2: If the owner can position the R&D project, he chooses a closer
proximity to basic research than the manager and the optimal incentive of the
manager is lower-powered.
Proof: Under the owner’s rule, the optimal incentive from (4) is 3 4O O
cb b
rv
- = .
Rearranging equation (7) for the optimal incentive under the manager’s rule yields
2 3
M M
cb b
rv
- = . We note that the first and second order conditions are satisfied
simultaneously for 2
3M
b >  and 3
4O
b > . Graphical illustration in figure 1 shows that
when the owner can choose the project direction, the optimal incentive turns out to be
12
lower than when the manager chooses the project, * *O Mb b< . (See figure 1). From
Lemma 1 we can infer that since also ( )2* *O Mb b< , this implies * *O Mk k> .12 QED.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.025
0.05
0.075
0.1
0.125
0.15
Piece rate b
Figure 1. Optimal incentive under manager’s and
owner’s rule
*
Mb
*
Ob
2 3b b- 3 4b b-
c
rv
Our earlier result in Lemma 1 was that for a given incentive coefficient, the owner
chooses closer proximity to basic research than the manager. The fact that the owner
chooses always a lower incentive coefficient further increases the difference. Under
the owner’s rule, the manager’s R&D effort is low and the firm utilizes much basic
research.
 If the manager makes the (unobservable) choice of the project position *Mk , the
decision rule is not optimal from the owner’s point of view. In the margin, the
12 From the graph we can also note that the incentive problem has an interior solution under manager’s
rule when ( )2 3supc b brv < -
 translating to 40 0.148
27
c
rv
< < »  and under owner’s rule when
( )3 4supc b brv < -
, in turn yielding 270 0.105
256
c
rv
< < »  .
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manager receives only the portion *Mb  of increased revenue (5) whereas the owner
receives all of it (3b). Yet both have to take into account same marginal costs of
uncertainty and effort.   To maximize utility, the manager chooses lesser proximity to
basic research, * *M Ok k< . The owner compensates this choice by inducing higher
effort by choosing a higher-powered incentive, * *M Ob b> . The optimal choices of the
owner and the manager imply that profits are equal or higher in the case where the
owner chooses the R&D project, ( ) ( )* * * *, ,O O O M M Mb k b kp p³  than when the manager
does that. This is obvious since under the owner’s rule, he maximises profits by
simultaneously determining *Ob  and
*
Ok  whereas under the manager’s rule, he
determines *Mk  to maximise utility. Anticipating this, the owner chooses
*
Mb  and these
choices are suboptimal for profit maximization. An interesting implication arises: In
an industry with entry barriers and basic research presence, we should see more firms
with knowledgeable owners that are able to direct firm R&D. Furthermore, the
importance of the owner’s expertise in R&D and basic research provides a motivation
for Venture Capital presence in such industries. Institutional owners share ownership
with VCs to be able to utilize their industry skills also in R&D strategy and contract
design.
Analysis of the optimal incentive coefficients yields a surprising result:
Proposition 3: If the manager or the owner can choose the position of the R&D
project relative to basic research, the optimal incentive coefficient is decreasing
in the cost of effort, but increasing in the manager’s risk-aversion and the
variance of the basic research outcome.
Proof: Graphic illustration shows that
*
0Mdb
cd
rv
<
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
 and
*
0Odb
cd
rv
<
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
. Thus the optimal
contract incentive is decreasing in the cost of effort and increasing in risk aversion
and variance. QED.
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The result is in stark contrast to current literature and provides one explanation to
Prendergast’s (2002) finding that more than half of some twenty empirical studies on
incentives cannot confirm the negative relationship between risk and the level of
incentive. If the project positions are given, the incentive coefficient decreases in risk-
aversion and revenue variance as in the standard model (Proposition 1). Now the
incentive coefficient increases in risk-aversion and variance. Why is this? In the
standard case, the risk premium is increasing in the incentive coefficient. Under the
owner’s rule, his optimal choices * *,O Ob k  imply that the risk premium is decreasing in
the incentive coefficient and the revenue from basic research is independent of the
incentive. Under the manager’s rule, the higher an incentive coefficient the owner
chooses, the more distant an R&D project position the manager selects, because the
risk premium increases faster than wage in *Mk . The owner takes this into account in
his optimal choice of the incentive coefficient. From his point of view, the risk
premium turns out constant but the expected revenue from basic research decreases in
the incentive *Mb  (and in the basic research outcome variance and in the manager’s
risk aversion) via its effect on *Mk  chosen by the manager. Since the manager’s effort
increases in the incentive coefficient, this implies the following:
Result: R&D effort is increasing in the risk level of the basic research project
provided that the either the owner or manager can align the R&D project with
it. If not, R&D effort decreases in basic research risk level.
Let us analyse the decision rules (2, 3b, IC2) that bind the utilization of basic
research, k , to the incentive coefficient b . In all of them, there is an inverse relation
between the variables.  The R&D effort is determined by b and thus we can say that
Result: For 0k > , the utilization of basic research and R&D effort crowd each
other out due to moral hazard in R&D.
So far, we have abstracted from market uncertainty. We can incorporate it to the
analysis by replacing the revenue equation (1) by R e ky m= + +% % % , where ( )0,m N z% .
Let us analyse the effect of market risk to the results. We note that market risk does
15
not affect the manager’s incentive compatibility conditions or the owner’s condition
for optimal Ok . However, it enters into the owner’s profit maximization problem via
the individual rationality condition. Under owner’s rule, the equation for optimal
incentive (4) is transformed to ( ) 4 31 0crzc b b
rv
+ - + =  and under the manager’s rule,
(7) turns into ( ) 3 21 0crzc b b
rv
+ - + = . The larger is the term rcz , the smaller are the
terms ( )2 31b rzc b- +  and ( )3 41b rzc b- + . From the graph in figure 1 we can deduce
that that the optimal incentive is thus decreasing in the term rcz . Combining this with
the result of proposition 3, we note that an increase in the market variance, z , and in
effort cost, c , lower the optimal incentive as predicted by Holmström and Milgrom.
The result of proposition 3 regarding the variance of the effort of the OS community,
v ,  holds. The effect of risk aversion, r , to the incentive is now ambiguous and
depends on variances of the market and OS effort uncertainty.
4 Conclusion
We analysed the optimal employment contract under moral hazard when basic
research exists and its output either lowers the costs of R&D or interacts with the
firm’s R&D in the market. The trade-off between increased revenue and increased
uncertainty results in a bounded optimum for the closeness between the basic research
and R&D. The owner chooses a closer proximity than does the manager and this leads
to a lower powered incentive. Optimal incentive coefficients in both cases are
increasing in risk aversion and variance contrary to the traditional result. Our work
has policy implications. If the position of basic research is given (Proposition 1), the
firm is a monopoly, but constrained by two effects: The substitute basic research is an
invisible (in revenue terms) competitor to the firm and reduces its profits. In addition
to that, the uncertainty related to the basic research outcome worsens the moral hazard
problem and lowers the manager’s effort, which results in further reduction of profits.
A firm may be a monopoly if one looks at the market research data, but at the same
time it may also face competition in the market and severe moral hazard problems in
employment due to basic research, especially Open Source, presence. This may be
16
something that, for example, competition authorities should take into account when
assessing market power of firms in the IT-industry.
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